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A
mAbstract
Entrepreneurs allocate resources among different activities that generates a profit; in
particular, in this paper entrepreneurs consider at each instant of time both innovation
and rent-seeking as alternative sources of profit. The consequences in terms of
economic growth are obviously quite different: the higher the amount of innovations
in the economy the higher the rate of economic growth and vice versa. What are the
determinants of these different entrepreneurial behavior? Is there anything in the
nature of entrepreneurs that essentially distinguishes between innovators and rent
seekers? A main claim of this paper is that differences among entrepreneurs are not
essential but of degree: all of them are in fact profit-seekers and the only difference is
to be found in their attitude towards innovation as a source of profit. In this sense
entrepreneurial effort is defined and modelled for each entrepreneur according to its
propensity to innovate and the corresponding Entrepreneurial Problem (EP) is posed
and solved both analytically and via simulation in terms of profit maximization. The
individual decisions measured in units of innovation are then aggregated to calculate
the innovation quantity for a given population based on the distribution of heterogeneous
entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurship rate and the implications for economic
growth are also modelled. Consequently, policy makers should focus on reducing
the entry barriers and the costs of production in order to stimulate the entrepreneurial
activity and maximize the innovation quantity.
Keywords: Entrepreneurial heterogeneity; Propensity towards innovation; Allocation of
entrepreneurial effort; Endogenous growthBackground
In a letter to F.A. Walker, Léon Walras claimed that the definition of entrepreneur was,
under his point of view, “le nœud de toute l’économique” (Walras 1965). Entrepreneurship
plays a fundamental role in the explanation of many economic phenomena, but at the
same time there must exist few central economic concepts that have been understood
and applied in such a diverse manner (Casson 1982, 1987; Casson et al. 2006). Thus, the
entrepreneur is the agent who, in the search for profit, coordinates the markets –this is
the case of Walrasian and neoclassical economics and, in a very especial sense, Austrian
economics (Kirzner 1992)-; introduces new combinations in the economic life (Schumpeter
(1932) [2005]; Schumpeter (1934) [1983]; assumes the risks involved in all the decisions
that are taken in contexts of true uncertainty (Knight 1921); etc. In any case, economists
agree on that the main contribution of the entrepreneur within the economy consists of
increasing the productivity of the system through innovation. Moreover, it is pursuing
their own interest (profits) that entrepreneurs coordinate and enhance the productivity of
the economy thus promoting economic growth.2014 Muñoz and Otamendi; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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not exclude other sources of profit for entrepreneurs. In fact, as overwhelming evidence
from economic history suggests, rent-seeking may be considered also as an entrepre-
neurial activitya. In this case, their activity consists mainly of pursuing the maximum
possible profits not linked to innovations or activities that generate productivity gains.
By behaving in such a manner, depending on their capacity to absorb resources of the
economy, this type of entrepreneurship may end up rationing scarce resources required
by the innovator-entrepreneurs to develop their activities; i.e.: rationing the necessary
resources that will truly promote increases in productivity of the economy in the long
term (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Murphy et al. 1991, 1993).
How can be these alternative uses of entrepreneurial capacity –and their different conse-
quences in terms of economic growth- be integrated in a single model without assuming
that innovative entrepreneurs and rent-seeking entrepreneurs are essentially different?
Departing from Baumol (1968) seminal work, we develop a quite simple idea in order to
link different entrepreneurial activities under a single “entrepreneurial problem”. We do so
by introducing entrepreneurial heterogeneity by assuming that entrepreneurial activities
may be any combination of the two extreme kinds: innovative and rent-seeking. However,
contrary to Baumol’s claim that “no exhaustive analysis of the process of allocation of entre-
preneurial activity among the set of available options will be attempted” and therefore “only
at least one of the prime determinants of entrepreneurial behavior at any particular time
and place is the prevailing rules of the game that govern the payoff of one entrepreneurial
activity relative to another” (Baumol 1990, 898, emphasis in the original), we model differ-
ent entrepreneurial activities without assuming that entrepreneurs are essentially different,
and explore the implications of different structures of payoffs over innovation activities.
For doing so, we introduce as a characteristic or each entrepreneur an attitude or
propensity towards innovation and distribute it among a (theoretical) population of en-
trepreneurs. Thus, we define an entrepreneurial distribution function between the two
extremes –pure innovators and rent-seekers-, a function that captures the hypothesis of
heterogeneity of entrepreneurs. The distribution of entrepreneurs’ attitude towards
innovation consists of assuming that each entrepreneur in the economy establishes the
relative value of each of the two extreme types together with the restrictions that im-
pinge upon these values. Next we assume that each (heterogeneous) entrepreneur max-
imizes his utility function associated to innovation opportunities and the possibility of
obtaining economic rents, subject to a minimum level of (subjective) profits. Given the
entrepreneur’s attitude towards innovation, and depending on the availability of alterna-
tive earnings within the economic system (rents), he decides how many resources they
will devote to innovation, taking also the entry barrier costs into account. Formally, the
entrepreneurial problem (EP) could be then stated as follows for each entrepreneur:
Max: Utility due to entrepreneurial effort
s.t. profit is at least enough to compensate entry barrier costs in innovation and
alternative sources of gains (rents)
Finally this individual behavior is embedded into an endogenous growth model in
order to capture the process of “creating entrepreneurs” and its implication in the
economy. The individual innovation efforts are aggregated for a given distribution of
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lice implications. The rate of entrepreneurship is also calculated as a by-product.
Methods
In order to characterize each entrepreneur, we describe the two extreme types of atti-
tudes towards innovation that frame the strategies of the individuals:
(a) type 0, entrepreneurs associated with pure innovative activities
(b) type 1, entrepreneurs whose underlying (and unique) objective is the search for the
maximum possible source of earnings –rents- in the economy.
By doing so, each entrepreneur might be represented by his specific position between
the two extremes: his relative position is defined by δ ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, by construc-
tion, δ is both the propensity and the “psychological distance” of any given entrepre-
neur from the extreme type 0 –being an innovator. Consequentially, (1 - δ) is the
“psychological distance” from type 1 –being a rent-seeker. Each entrepreneur has there-
fore two ways of obtaining utility gains: via pure innovation; and via economic profit,
which may be obtained either by innovating or by other alternative activities such as
rent-seeking. How each entrepreneur weighs exactly each possibility of improving his
personal situation is described by his propensity to innovate, δ.
Each entrepreneur δ must first decide how much of the innovative good he would
produce, should he choose to produce it at all, and then he must decide which activity
he will finally opt for. Let q(δ) be the amount of innovation that an entrepreneur of
type δ will produce under the assumption that an invention is availableb. In other
words, q(δ) is the effort towards innovation that an individual entrepreneur allocates.
Whenever facing the allocation problem, the entrepreneur will then have to decide
between:
(a) producing a positive quantity of the innovative good, q(δ) > 0
(b) obtaining a “rent” by carrying out other activities in some other sector of the
economy; in this case q(δ) = 0.
The objective function: utility gains
To decide on how to allocate the innovation effort among the different alternatives, the ob-
jective of a given entrepreneur δ is defined in terms of a subjective utility function that mea-
sures the degree in which the entrepreneur takes part in activities of type 0 and of type 1.
U δ; qð Þ ¼ 1−δð Þ u qð Þ þ δv π qð Þð Þ ð1Þ
The first term, u(q), represents the average earnings in utility terms that the entrepre-neur can obtain by innovating, which depends directly on the amount of the innovative
good that is introduced into the economy. On the other hand, the second term, π(q), is
the profit associated with a given amount of the innovative good q and v(π(q)) is the
utility gains that this profit produces. It is this second term that allows entrepreneur δ
to compare the profits associated with this activity with the profit that can be obtained
by alternative uses of his entrepreneurial capacityc.
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defined by:
π qð Þ≡ p qð Þ−cð Þq ð2Þ
where p(q) is the demand function for the innovative good; and c is the average cost as-
sociated with the production of an additional unit of q.
The binding restriction: the necessary condition to innovate
Although maximizing profits, no entrepreneur would want to become bankrupt by car-
rying out the innovative activity that he values most. He will always search for a satis-
ficing earning that is at least equal to the cost of innovating, α0, should he decide to
repeat his plan in the future. The entrepreneur will then compare this earning, from
his position δ, with his other options, the non-innovation rents, denoted by R. This
minimal condition to innovate may be defined as follows:
p qð Þ−cð Þq ¼ π qð Þ½  ≥ α ⋅ð Þ ¼ α δ; α0;Rð Þ½  ð3Þ
where α(·) is a function that sets the minimum yield (satisficing threshold) that the plan
of each type δ entrepreneur must obtain. This function α(·) has as arguments:
(1) the propensity of the entrepreneur towards innovation, δ
(2) the cost of introducing an innovation or entry barrier, α0
(3) the gains that can be obtained in other sectors of the economy, R. (This last
variable together with π(q) represent the structure of payoffs of the economy.)
In order to innovate, that is, for q(δ) > 0, it must happen that, the minimum condition
π(q) ≥ α(·) is satisfied. If it is not satisfied for the corresponding values of α0 and R, the
entrepreneur chooses not to innovate in new goods, q(δ) = 0, and engages in rent-
seeking activities.
The entrepreneur’s problem (EP)
We may then formally set the “allocation of entrepreneurial effort” problem as follows
after consistently combining the type of entrepreneurship, the decision variable, the
objective function and the binding restriction:
EPð Þ :
(
max
q≥0
U δ; qð Þ ¼ 1−δð Þu qð Þ þ δv π qð Þð Þ
s:t:: π qð Þ≡ p qð Þ−cð Þq≥α δ; α0;Rð Þ
ð4Þ
Results and discussion
The allocation of entrepreneurial effort
The decision that each economic agent should take concerning the allocation of the
entrepreneurial effort depends therefore on α0, R, c, p, and δ
d; although the (EP) solu-
tion for each particular entrepreneur δ exists and it is uniquee. We denote this
optimum innovation quantity by:f
q δð Þ ¼ q α0;R; c; p; δð Þ ð5Þ
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for sensitivity, it can be shown thatg:
∂q
∂α0
< 0;
∂q
∂R
< 0;
∂q
∂c
< 0;
∂q
∂p
> 0;
∂q
∂δ
< 0 ð6Þ
In words, the quantity of innovation goods generated by the solution of (EP) ishigher:
(1) the lower the minimum profit claimed by entrepreneurs in innovative activities, α0;
(2) the lower the alternative sources of gains, R;
(3) the lower the cost of producing innovations, c;
(4) the higher the price of innovations, p;
(5) the higher the individual propensity to innovate, that is, the lower δ.
These statements look intuitive if taken one-at-a-time. However, if all the effect are
jointly considered and analyzed, we may summarize the decision possibilities faced by
the entrepreneur as follows: (a) there will never be innovation if the entry barrier cost
is higher than the profit, regardless of the entrepreneurial type and the propensity to
innovate; (b) there will always be innovation if the profit is higher than the alternative
rent, regardless of the entrepreneurial type; and (c) otherwise, some entrepreneurs
might innovate, depending on where the value of the profit lies with respect to the
entry barrier and the rents.Entrepreneurship and economic growth: some policy implications
The aggregate behavior of the economy depends on how, not the individual entre-
preneurs allocate their efforts according to the (EP), but all of the entrepreneurs
jointly carry out their activities. Different social structures of payoffs (Baumol 1994)
will result in different economic performances (in terms of growth of output, for
example) through the different ways to allocate the efforts of innovation of the
entrepreneurs. The internal evolution of the social dynamics also determines the
distribution of entrepreneurs within a given economy between the two extreme
types.
Modern endogenous growth models in economy stress the deep relationship that ex-
ists between entrepreneurship and the economic performance of a society as measured
for example by the per capita output growth (Acemoglu 2009). The answers provided
by economic growth theory are rather varied, ranging from models that abstract entre-
preneurial activity (see for example Mankiw et al. (1992), Solow (1956) to those that
formally integrate entrepreneurship into models that incorporate the intentional actions
of entrepreneurs in the explanation of how the rate of growth is determined (Aghion
and Howitt 1998; Romer 1994).
We have decided to follow this second route due to the easy and consistent fit of
the (EP) philosophy into the complex mathematics of the growth models, with the ne-
cessary previous aggregation of individual decisions into macroeconomic magnitudes:
aggregated innovation quantities and rate of entrepreneurship.
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The aggregate value of innovation for the economy as a whole, Q, is determined by
adding the individual quantities of innovation across all the entrepreneurs δ. Thus:
Q ¼
Z 1
0
q δð Þf δð Þdδ ð7Þ
Let us denote by f (δ) the density function of the propensity to innovate, in order tocharacterize any given economy. A higher propensity of society towards innovation is
captured in the model by a “higher” density of entrepreneur propensity to innovate.
The shape of this last “variable” f (δ) may differ drastically between economies –both
between different contemporaneous economies and the same economy at different
timesh.
The economic policy efforts should then be based on the maximization of not only
the individual entrepreneurship activities, q *, but also on the distribution of the pro-
pensities f (δ) in order to increase the number of entrepreneurs; that is, politicians
should foster that entrepreneurs shift their propensity towards pure innovation (1 − δ),
lowering their individual δ.
Entrepreneurship rate
From the solution of (EP) it is also possible to directly define and calculate an index
that refers to the rate of innovative entrepreneurs of a given economy. We define
the entrepreneurship rate as δ0. Its value, which ranges between 0 and 1, is calcu-
lated by solving:
πmax ¼ α α0;R; δ0ð Þ ð8Þ
Those entrepreneurs with 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ0 will allocate efforts to entrepreneurial activities
since their propensity to innovate δ is close enough to pure innovation (δ = 0), while
those with higher values of δ will not as they are closer to rent-seeking (δ = 1). The eco-
nomic implications of this index are that policies centered in economic growth should
strive for lowering both the entry barriers and the other rents of the economy and to
increase the profit associated to innovation.
Economic growth
In order to study how the aggregate allocation of the entrepreneurial efforts affects
the dynamics of the economy, we use an adapted version of Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991) endogenous growth model for evaluating the evolution of the rate of change of
innovations over time, denoted by γy. According to this model, the rate of change of
innovations is:
γy ¼
1−μð ÞβQ− _Qc
QC−α0
ð9Þ
where we assume a consumption function C = μY with a constant marginal propensity
to consume 0 < μ < 1; and β is the productivity of the innovationi.
This rate of change is increasing in Q and decreasing in _Q . That is to say, the rate of
growth of the number of new goods is directly proportional to investment in the intro-
duction of new goods — and the proportion is the productivity of new goods —, and is
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duction of existing goods. Once again, entry barriers and costs should be lowered,
whereas productivity should be increased.
These statements perfectly fit into the framework of the individual (EP), giving
consistency to the overall approach of this research that relates the allocation of
innovation effort by heterogeneous entrepreneurs and the growth of the economy.
A numerical illustration
The (EP) model is both solvable analytically and by means of simulation techniques.
Next we propose to solve a theoretical example. For the sake of simplicity, let us use
linear functions and the following input values:
(a) p(q) = a − bq, with a, b > 0
(b) u(q) = dq, d > 0
v π qð Þð Þ ¼ q(c)α δ; α ;Rð Þ ¼ 1−δð Þα þ δR(d) 0 0
The formulation of the (EP) for each entrepreneur is then the following:
EPð Þ :
max
q≥0
U δ; qð Þ ¼ du qð Þ þ δπ qð Þ
s:t: : π qð Þ≥α δ; α0;Rð Þ ¼ 1−δð Þα0 þ δR
(
ð10Þ
Analytically, the solution is given by:q δ; α0;Rð Þ ¼
min q1 δ;Rð Þ; q2 δ;Rð Þf g if α δ;Rð Þ≤
a−cð Þ2
4b
0 if α δ;Rð Þ > a−cð Þ
2
4b
8><
>: ð11Þ
Whereq1 ¼
a−cð Þ
2b
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a−cð Þ2−4bα ⋅ð Þ
q
2b
q2 ¼
a−c−dð Þ
2b
þ d
2bδ
ð12Þ
The entrepreneurship rate (δ0) follows:
δ0 ¼
a−cð Þ2
4b −α0
R−α0
ð13ÞWe proceed to further assign numerical values to the input variables:
 R = 0.33
 α0 = 0.01
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 c = 2.75
 d = 0.20; u(q) = 0.20q
Figure 1 shows the quantity of innovation for each entrepreneur as a function of the
distance δ to pure innovation. The theoretical break point or entrepreneurship rate is
at δ0 = 0.5617 for any f (δ). It also shows that the quantity is calculated from function
q1 if δ < 0.091 and from function q2 if 0.091 < δ < 0.5617.
However, even in this simple case, it is not straightforward to calculate the amount of
innovation in the economy, because it is very complex to integrate Q due to the exist-
ence (at least a priori) of non-linearities in the model and due to the shape of f(δ). For
the specific case of the Uniform distribution, U(0, 1), the average of the quantity of
innovation is Q * = 0.1293.
Concerning the growth of the economy, if the propensity to consume is μ = 0.8 and
the productivity is β = 1.5, the rate of innovation is γy = 10.91%.
The allocation problem is also simulated both to validate the analytical solution and
also to assess variability in terms of the number of entrepreneurs in the populationj.
For N = 200 entrepreneurs, 50 simulations are run. The main results are that the quan-
tity of innovation in the economy, Q*, lies between 21.2820 and 29.4426 with an aver-
age of 26.1124 (its theoretical value is Q* = 25.8557); the rate of entrepreneurship, δ0,
lies between 45% and 65.5% with an average of 56.54% (its theoretical value is δ0 =
56.17%); and the rate of change of the economy, γy, lies between 10.9272% and
10.9277% (its theoretical value is γy = 10.9276%).Figure 1 Solution of the (EP) model as a function of the propensity to innovation.
Muñoz and Otamendi Journal of Global Entrepreneurship Research 2014, 2:8 Page 9 of 17
http://www.journal-jger.com/content/2/1/8Conclusions
In this paper we consider that entrepreneurial activities range from innovation to rent-
seeking. This assumption allows us to link both innovation and rent-seeking in a uni-
tary formal framework of entrepreneurship. From (EP) it is possible to establish the re-
lationship between variables such as minimum profit threshold (a version of the
satisfying behavior hypothesis (Cooper 2003, 26); opportunity of gains in other sectors
of the economy (Baumol’s structure of payoffs); the costs of innovation; and the quan-
tity of innovation finally produced depending on the attitude of entrepreneurs them-
selves and society in general towards innovation effort -defined by f(δ) -, and the
consequences of their joint study in the rate of growth of economic output.
In the allocation of effort (EP) problem, each entrepreneur δ compares the potential
earnings associated with the production of the innovative good q*, with an alternative
source of earnings linked to rent-seeking activities, R. If the minimum condition to
innovate is not satisfied, the entrepreneur chooses not to introduce new goods and engages
in rent-seeking activities. The formal problem is an illustration of how the entrepreneur
faces the dilemma of how to allocate the scarce resources to which he has access with the
intention of getting what he esteems it should be a gain high enough linked to his activity.
The (EP) problem is solvable both analytically and by means of simulation tech-
niques. In fact, simulation is a reliable option whenever analytical solutions are diffi-
cult to obtain. A validation exercise has been carried out using linear functions in
order to provide an illustration of how the model works. A natural extension of (EP)
would consist of parameterizing the input variables, specifically the entrepreneurial
function f(δ), and performing a robust study of the behavior of the model with ad-hoc
simulations.
The solution of (EP) establishes a relationship between the quantity of innovation
for each entrepreneur as a function of the distance δ to pure innovation and rent-
seeking. It also allows for the definition of an entrepreneurial index that quantifies
the proportion (δ0) of innovative entrepreneurs of a given economy. Entrepreneurs
within the interval 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ0 will innovate and those with higher values of δ will
not.
The implications on economic growth follow. Policy makers should implement pol-
icies that reduce the opportunity costs of innovation, R, as well as the entry barrier
costs, α0; the direct costs of production of innovations (for example subsidizing
innovation activities), c; and promoting an innovation culture that shapes the propen-
sity to innovation distribution f(δ) in favor of innovative activities.
Endnotes
aRent-seeking behavior has a long history in economics, dating back to the seminal
work of Tullock (1967). The basic idea is best demonstrated explaining the social wel-
fare losses involved in the establishment of monopolies, tariffs, and subsidies (Tullock
1987). There are recent attempts to propose models of rent-seeking behavior for
explaining the resource curse phenomenon see Torvik (2002), Mehlum et al. (2006),
Hodler (2006), Arezki and Brückner (2010). Another approach consists of examining
the political economy of intellectual property, private and public rent-seeking and its
role for the social usefulness of innovation (Boldrin and Levine 2004; Boldrin and
Levine 2008).
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existing one but with new features that makes it more productive (Grossman and
Helpman 1991).
cNote that the first term always refers to the utility obtained from innovating.
dFor simplicity, we have set α0 and R as constants and equal for all entrepreneurs,
identical for all types of innovations. The same assumptions can be applied to the aver-
age costs of production of an additional unit of the new good, c.
eThe continuity of the utility function and the fact that the feasible set is closed and
bounded guarantees that there exists a global maximum (Weierstrass Theorem). More-
over, since the function is strictly concave and the feasible set is convex, the Fundamen-
tal Theorem of Convex Programming guarantees that the global maximum of (EP) is
unique.
fThe different regimes of solution are summarized in Table 1 and their mathematical
derivation is included in Appendix I.
gSee Appendix III.
hThe main results are summarized in a formal proposition in Appendix I and the
proofs are included in Appendixes III and IV.
iFor more details, see Appendix V.
jFor a description of the pseudocode of the simulation model see Muñoz and
Otamendi (2012).
kWe apply the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
lSee Appendix II for a formal proof.
mSee Appendix III.
nWe say “decreasing” rather than the partial derivative is negative, since there exist
points at which the functions are not differentiable. Since they are continuous, the form
of the relationship is maintained.
oFor a proof of this proposition, see Appendices III and IV.
pSee Appendix IV.Appendix I: regimes of solution for (EP)
We assume that u′, v′ > 0 and u″, v″ ≤ 0; π″ < 0; the marginal cost is positive c > 0; δ ∈
[0, 1]; R ≥ α0 > 0 ; the demand for innovative products is p(0) > c; and there exists a q^
such that p(q) = 0, for all q≥q^ and p′(q) < 0 for all q < q′; the properties of the threshold
function are α′δ δ; α0;Rð Þ > 0, α′α0 δ; α0;Rð Þ > 0, α′R δ; α0;Rð Þ > 0; and the two extreme
cases are α(0, α0, R) = α0 and α(1, α0, R) = R. From the assumptions on the demand for
new goods, there exists a ~q∈ 0; q^ð Þ such that p ~qð Þ ¼ c. Therefore, π 0ð Þ ¼ ~π ~qð Þ ¼ 0. Fi-
nally, from the concavity of the profit function follows that there exists a global max-
imum of π(q), q∈ 0; ~q½  . Hence, it holds that π′(q) > 0 if 0≤q≤q ; and π′(q) < 0 whenTable 1 Results of the simulation
Entrepreneurship rate δ0 Innovation quantity Q* Innovation rateof change γ
Theoretical Average 56.17% 25.85 10.9076%
Simulated Minimum 45.00% 21.28 10.9072%
Average 56.54% 26.11 10.9076%
Maximum 65.50% 29.44 10.9077%
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δ type entrepreneur.
From the functions π(q) and α(·), the feasible set for each type δ entrepreneur, Bδ, is
determined by Bδ = {q ∈ℝ/π(q) ≥ α(δ, α0, R)}. Figure 2 represents this set.
For each value of π(q) and α(•) there are two possibilities:
π qð Þ≥α
if α > πmax; then Bδ ¼ ∅
if α≤πmax; then Bδ≠∅
(
ðAI:1Þ
In the second case, the feasible set is determined by the interval:
Bδ ¼ qm δð Þ; qM δð Þ½  ðAI:2Þ
The continuity of the utility function U(δ, q) and the fact that the feasible set is closed
and bounded guarantees that there exists a global maximum (Weierstrass Theorem).
Moreover, since U(δ, q) is strictly concave and the feasible set is convex, the Fundamen-
tal Theorem of Convex Programming guarantees that the global maximum of (EP) is
unique. We denote this maximum by q*(δ).
Innovation regimes when Bδ ≠∅
In the most interesting and general case there are two possibilities: (a) that the solution
to (EP) is strictly interior, and (b) the solution lies on the frontier of the feasible setk. If
the solution is interior, then it must hold that the optimal q*(δ) is that which maximizes
type δ entrepreneur’s utility (for λ = 0); i.e.: a value of q such that (1 − δ)u′(q) + δv′
(π(q))π′(q) = 0. Equivalently, the condition that must be satisfied is:
v′ π qð Þð Þπ′ qð Þ
u′ qð Þ ¼
1−δ
δ
 
ðAI:3Þ
In this condition the left-hand-side term may be interpreted as some type of marginal
rate of substitution between innovations and profit that depends on the relative pos-
ition of each entrepreneur in the distribution f(δ). On the other hand, the frontier solu-
tion applies when π(q) > α(δ). In this second case, the solution is given by the
restriction of (EP). In principle, this solution could be at either q* = qm(δ) or q* = qM(δ).Figure 2 The set of feasible solutions Bδ.
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it holds that π′(q*) < 0, and so the solution is given by q*(δ) = qM(δ).
Another interesting feature of this model is that it generates a change in the solution
regime when the solution passes from interior to binding or vice versa. This asymmet-
ric behavior (some entrepreneurs behave like type 0s, while other like type 1s) is quite
logical given the special functional form that has been assumed for the general utility
function of the entrepreneurs, U(δ, q), i.e.: a linear combination of the two extreme, or
pure, types of behavior. There is exactly one (or some) intermediate value that weighs
the two parts of the utility function equally. (Appendix III provides the formal proof.)
Comparative statics
From Eq. (5), it is possible to analyze the relationships between the solution of the
amount of innovation and the other arguments of the function. An unusual characteris-
tic of (EP) solution is that it appears in zones within the distribution, which implies that
these partial relationships within each zone must be considered, bearing in mind at all
times the points at which one regimen of solution joins another. These joining points
take place at the values δ^ that satisfy the following conditionl:
H qM δð Þð Þ < −
1−δ
δ
 
ðAI:4Þ
In any case, it can be shown for both solution regimes (interior and frontier) thatm:∂q
∂α0
< 0;
∂q
∂R
< 0;
∂q
∂c
< 0;
∂q
∂p
> 0;
∂q
∂δ
< 0; ðAI:5Þ
Consequentially, given the functional relationships that have been assumed for de-mand, utility, variable costs, attitude towards innovation and the profit restriction, etc.,
the relationship q*(δ) = q(δ, α0, R, c, p) is decreasing
n in the position of the entrepreneur
in the entrepreneurial capacity distribution, δ, in the economic cost of developing in-
ventions, α0; in the rents available within the economic system, R; and in the variable
production cost associated with innovations, c. Obviously, there is a positive depend-
ence on the demand for innovative goods. That is, the closer is an entrepreneur (psy-
chologically) to being of type 1 (i.e.: values profits relatively more), the greater is R; the
greater is the cost of production of innovations (a usual argument for subsidizing
innovation activities); and the greater the unitary production costs are; the lower the in-
novative activity of entrepreneurs as measured by q will be. The following proposition
resumes the main results.
Proposition: There exists a single solution to (EP) for each δ, denoted by q*(δ) = q*
(δ, α0, R, c, p) that is continuous (except at the point ~δ whenever this is not greater than
1) on the interval [0, 1], that is differentiable at almost all points. Moreover, the aggre-
gate solution of (EP), Q δð Þ ¼
Z 1
0
q δð Þf δð Þdδ is decreasing in α0, R and c, and increas-
ing in f and po.
Appendix II: switching point
Change in solution regime: the problem is to find out whether the solution of (EP) is in-
terior or on the frontier (existence and uniqueness are guaranteed). Consider the function
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′ π qð Þð Þπ′ qð Þ
u′ qð Þ ðAII:1Þ
We have H qð Þ ¼ 0 and H is strictly decreasing since H′(q) < 0. Therefore, the solu-
tion is interior if and only if
H qM δð Þð Þ < −
1−δ
δ
 
ðAII:2Þ
In case (C.1) and in those cases of (C.2) in which the Bδ ≠∅ (see Table 2), these twoinnovation regimes are operative. Moreover, there exist some values δ^ for which these
regime changes will occur. For these δ^ there will be an “inflection” (or connection) be-
tween the two types of solution. At these solutions it must hold that:
H qM δð Þð Þ ¼ −
1−δ
δ
q δð Þ ¼ qM δð Þ
that is; δ^ ¼
v′ π q δð Þð Þð Þπ′ q δð Þð Þ
u q δð Þð Þ ¼ −
1−δ
δ
 
π q δð Þð Þ ¼ α δð Þ
8<
:
8<
: ðAII:3Þ
Appendix III: comparative statics
Consider q*(δ) = q(δ, α0, R, c, p). We have to distinguish between interior and frontier
solutions.
Derivatives with respect to δ.
Interior solution.
v′ π q δð Þð Þð Þπ′ q δð Þð Þ
u q δð Þð Þ ¼ −
1−δ
δ
 
ðAIII:1Þ
From whichq′ δð Þ ¼ u
′ q δð Þð Þ−v′ π q δð Þð Þð Þπ′ q δð Þð Þ
δ v″ π q δð Þð Þð Þ π′ q δð Þð Þð Þ2 þ δ v′ π q δð Þð Þð Þπ″ q δð Þð Þ þ 1−δð Þu″ q δð Þð Þ < 0
ðAIII:2ÞTable 2 Summary of results
Regime Entrepreneur Binding restriction Solution
A Pure Innovator δ = 0 π(q) ≥ α0 Profit≥ Entry Barrier q*(0) > 0, if α0 ≤ πmax
q*(0) = 0, if α0 > πmax
B Rent Seeker δ = 1 π(q) ≥ R Profit≥Other Rents q*(1) > 0, if α(1) ≤ π(q*(1))
q*(1) = 0, if α(1) = R > π(q*(1))
C C1 Heterogeneous α0≤ R≤ πmax Profit≥ Other
rents≥ Entry barrier
q*(δ) > 0; entrepreneurial activity for sure
C2 α0≤ πmax≤ R Profit in between
rents and entry barriers
Some entrepreneurs allocate effort if
propensity to innovate is high
C3 πmax < α0 Profit < Entry barrier q*(δ) = 0; No entrepreneurial activity at all
Muñoz and Otamendi Journal of Global Entrepreneurship Research 2014, 2:8 Page 14 of 17
http://www.journal-jger.com/content/2/1/8Frontier solution: we begin with π(q(δ)) = α(δ). Hence,
q′ δð Þ ¼ α
′ αð Þ
π′ q δð Þð Þ < 0 ðAIII:3Þ
Note: we have discussed several solution regimes, which implies that one of them
could be repeated. But in any case, the dependence is inverse (negative). On the other
hand, it may well happen that, beginning with a particular value of δ the solutions
“jump” to zero. We have not studied these cases since the solution is to always have
zero innovations
Derivatives with respect to R.
Interior solution. Since the entrepreneur’s restriction is constant in R for each interior
value of δ, changes in R do not directly affect q* in this case. There is, however, an in-
direct effect, since R determines the value of the function α(•), and since α(•) defines
the set Bδ, changes in R will alter the values of δ that determine the changes in solution
regime.
Frontier solution. In this case, R has a direct effect on the restriction through the
function α(•). Hence, since π′(q(R))q′(R) = α′(R), we have
q′ Rð Þ ¼ α
′ Rð Þ
π′ q Rð Þð Þ < 0 ðAIII:4Þ
Derivatives with respect to c.
Interior solution. Beginning with (1 − δ)u′(q(c)) + δv′(π((c, q(c))))π′(c, q(c)) = 0, taking
π = π(c, q), π′ ¼ ∂π∂q and since ∂π∂c −q, together with the fact that p″(q(c))q(c) + 2p′(q(c)) = π″
(q(c)), we may conclude that
q′ cð Þ ¼ qδv
″ π c; q cð Þð Þð Þπ′ c; q cð Þð Þ þ δv′ π c; q cð Þð Þð Þ
δv″ π c; q cð Þð Þð Þ π′ c; q cð Þð Þð Þ2 þ δv′ π c; q cð Þð Þð Þπ″ c; q cð Þð Þ þ 1−δð Þu″ q cð Þð Þ < 0
ðAIII:5Þ
Frontier solution for π = π(c, q(c)) = α(·)
q′ cð Þ ¼ q
π′ c; q cð Þð Þ < 0 ðAIII:6Þ
Dependence on p.
An additional problem is that of the dependence of q on changes in the demand func-
tion, p(q). In this case the dependence is with respect to a function, which makes it im-
possible to evaluate, although it is clear that greater demand will imply greater profit
opportunities and, additionally, greater incentives to produce greater amounts of in-
novative goods.
Appendix IV: stochastic dominance
More interesting is to show how the solution to (EP) is affected by changes in the aggre-
gate distribution of entrepreneurial capacity. Although the solution is not trivial -since
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formation -, it is possible to establish one important result: the average level of
innovation in the economy -as measured from (9)- is greater in those economies
whose entrepreneurial capacity distribution function first order stochastic dominates
another. That is, given two different entrepreneurial capacity density functions, f1 and
f2, where we define Fi δð Þ ¼
Z δ
0
f i sð Þds, for i = 1, 2, if it holds that
F1 δð Þ≥F2 δð Þ; ∀δ ∈ 0; 1½  ðAIV:1Þ
then we have Q1 ≥Q2, for given values of the other variables
p. Graphically, distribution
f1 first order stochastic dominates f2 if their relative positions are as represented in
Figure 3.
If we denote Q1−Q2 ¼
Z 1
0
q δð Þ f 1 δð Þ−f 2 δð Þð Þdδ and integrate by parts, then
Q1−Q2 ¼ q δð Þ F1 δð Þ−F2 δð Þð Þj10−
Z 1
0
q′ δð Þ F1 δð Þ−F2 δð Þð Þdδ
¼ −
Z 1
0
q′ δð Þ F1 δð Þ−F2 δð Þð Þdδ > 0 ðAIV:2Þ
we have that Q1 ≥Q2.
Appendix V: growth model
We assume the following definition of capital:
K tð Þ ¼ A tð ÞQ tð Þ ðAV:1Þ
where K(t) is the accumulated amount of goods that have been incorporated in the pro-
duction process, and A(t) is the number of varieties of new production goods that have
been generated up to the moment of time t. That is to say, at each moment t, the
amount of varieties that can be used in the production of output is given by the
amount (and number) of innovative goods of previous periods, as well as those that are
introduced at moment t. Hence, the introduction of new goods will imply an increaseFigure 3 Stochastic dominance.
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and the dynamics of innovations.
In fact:
γy ¼ γA ¼
_A
A
¼ 1−μð ÞβQ−
_Qc
QC−α0
ðAV:2Þ
In the Rivera-Batiz and Romer model, changes in A are denoted as: _A ¼ τHA; that is,
the rate of growth of A is proportional to the human capital in the system, H, and a
parameter that measures the productivity of this capital, τ. In these types of model, it
also turns out that all inventions are introduced into the economic system as innova-
tions. In our case, things do not happen with such a high degree of automation, since
the entrepreneurs, from the problem (EP) and their relative types, δ, will determine the
amount of each invention (variety) that will be produced, where a possible solution is
that no positive amount at all is produced, i.e.: an invention is not transformed into an
innovation.
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